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Date: 15 Dec 1996 04:45:10 GMT
From: strange@tezcat.com (Mike Scher)
Message-ID: <58vvom$40b@tepe.tezcat.com>
Organization: Cultural Consulting, Chicago
References: <l03010d00aed8bcac04f8@[128.83.128.1]>, <58v83f$85f@Venus.mcs.net>, <distler-1412962214220001@slip-14-5.ots.utexas.edu>
Subject: Re: Securing POP with ssh (was: F-Secure SSH for Windows 1.0 available.)
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Jacques Distler (distler@golem.ph.utexas.edu) wrote:
: In article <58v83f$85f@Venus.mcs.net>, les@MCS.COM (Leslie Mikesell) wrote:
: 
: >Now can you give a list of unix machines where the administrator is willing
: >to keep the passwords in a file in cleartext as required by APOP?
: >
: 
: That is a red herring. 

Well, kind of, but . . . not quite.
 
: The file is readable only by root. Ssh (or any other encrypting daemon)
: also needs to keep its ("secret") keys  in a file in cleartext (eg,
: /etc/ssh_host_key). What else can you do? Encrypt the file? Then you need
: to store the key to decrypt it somewhere. . . 

One-way hashes don't need a key around; just a one-way hashing function; 
I know, for example, that FreeBSD's MD5-based crypt makes it a royal pain
to even crack password files (it runs 1000th iterations of the routine) 
grabbed as root.  The massive number of iterations just about makes you
want to borrow a Cray just to look for bad passwords as the admin.  Sure,
the machine may be owned to hell, but you still have the passwords
relatively tight in case they're repeated on other boxes.  Better than 
cleartext.
 
: The defect of APOP (which I readily admit) is in its (lack of) key
: management.  There is, for instance, no secure way for a remote user to
: *change* his password. 

Lack of integration with the password system is a big minus, agreed.

: This is not, in my opinion, a fatal defect. But it is certainly an area
: which could bear improvement.

Pain in the patoch, is how we put it.

      -M
-- 
Michael Brian Scher   (MS683)   | Anthropologist, Attorney, Part-Time Guru
http://www.tezcat.com/~strange/ |          strange@cultural.com
strange@tezcat.com              |       mbscher@midway.uchicago.edu
   I'm a legal anthropologist; what's an illegal anthropologist?
